OK, this is last nights productive outcome, and as I spend quite a bit of time on it, I thought I might as well post it on my blog. However if anyone should accidentially end up here - as if this would ever happen - I warn you, it is long (for a blog entry) and not necessarily interesting (unless of course you are highly interested in human rights and their possible implementation). If you prefer reading something lighter, just go to the next entries. Believe me, they are far more fun.
Having come this far legally, why then should we still be concerned with the philosophical foundations of human rights?
If you open a serious Newspaper and search for ‘human Rights’, you will pretty much every day find an article about their abuse, somewhere in the
world. Hence ‘this far’, as stated in the title question, is obviously ‘not far enough’. So although human rights are legally enshrined in international law, the compliance by the different actors – and these can vary from the state over individuals to organisations such as TNCs – varies and unfortunately is often very low.
How to increase this compliance is the central topic of this essay. It is not so much concerned with the ‘philosophical foundations’ itself, but with the question of why they are needed. As the very idea of ‘rights’ seems to hint on a legal context, this theme will be explore in the first part, where I will outline some of the shortcomings of the current legal systems.
The main part of the essay will be dedicated to the idea of the implementation of human rights, along the idea of social control through the means of coercion, self-interest and legitimacy, within the current global order. Thereby I will outline that the philosophical foundations, are by far the most promising instrument to ensure human rights as they are the central tool to provide the necessary legitimacy.
The underlying idea behind the title-question, is that as Human rights are regarded as an essential part of international law, we should engage more in the pragmatic implementation of this law, rather than engage in philosophical arguments of limited value outside the academic world. However sensible this approach might seem at a first glance, it does not fully grasp the problematic nature of the implementation of human rights in the real world. The fact that they are law, does not necessarily give them authority. Yet without the necessary authority, the implementation of human right will always stop short of an ideal. Hence human rights are not genuinely binding laws, but idealistic guidelines, that the global community officially embraces, but that in reality get easily sidelined.
If human rights are ever to be implemented on a global scale, they need to become more than guidlines, they need to become legal norms backed by authority. The fundamental problem is that, as human rights are regarded as universal, they consequently become global legislation. Human rights are written down as material source of international law in, for instance, the
UDHR. Yet, international law has little authority to implement them, as it is largely committed to inter-state issues
. Although this might ultimately be challenged by the foundation of the International Criminal Court. Yet until the individual nation-states are prepared to give up their sovereignty over legislation, this will in the best case lead to the occasional show trial of huge scale human right abusers, most likely after interventions. To fully engage in the jurisdiction of human right abuses the ICC will and can never have the necessary resources. So ultimately the ball goes back to the states, and national legislation and jurisdiction.
The body that actually needs to incorporate human rights to implement them effectively, is municipal law. Only if human rights are legislated and enforced within each nation-state, they can ultimately become universal. Human rights depend on compliance by the actors – namely the nation-states – to be realised. This paradox, that on the one hand, to be universal, they have to apply on a global scale, but to actually be implemented they need to apply within each national legislative body, leads to frequent confusion about who has the authority to define human rights. Accusations levelled at human rights as ‘western cultural imperialism’ is one of the consequences of this paradox. The basic question of human rights is therefore a question of authority. How to ensure compliance of human rights.
If human rights are regarded as normative rules within the international society, the major challenge is how to implement them. Ian Hurd
1 singled out three concepts of ‘social control’. Coercion, Self-interest and Legitimacy.
Coercion is generally associated with physical power or force. “The operative mechanism is fear or simple ‘compellance’”
1. Power in this concept is centralised in one pole, that ensures law and order by means of force and surveillance. According to Hobbes “
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”. Thus coercions, at least as a concept on its own, seems unsuitable to ensure human rights.
The idea that self-interest could lead to compliance to a rule is fairly common within the social sciences. But it is important to distinguish between self-interest and interest. While interest is more closely connected to legitimacy, self-interest is a constantly calculating reassessment of the situation, that is essentially “amoral with respect to one’s obligation towards others
”1. It is largely based on the concept of reciprocity and the contract philosophy. Hence the compliance of an actor is dependant on his assumption that others will do the same and that thereby a mutual benefit can arise. Yet if a rule is regarded as contrary to the self-interest it will be ignored. Social control based on pure self-interest is therefore not very stable. Another important feature of self-interest and more importantly reciprocity, is that it is dependent on roughly equal actors within the system. Kant’s
perpetual peace is centred on this concept. His peaceful society consists either of equal citizen within the state, or of equal republics on the international stage. Yet it does not consider state vs. individual relations. Here the idea of reciprocity fails, because while the state can violate the human rights of the individual, it does not have to fear the reciprocal consequence. While a state is more likely to comply with rules regarding its relation to other states, as in the case of the ‘corps diplomatique’, it does not consider its self-interest on a similar scale when engaging with its citizens. The same applies for corporations. So while it is highly questionable if self-interest will bring about compliance by nations, it is a very important tool to promote human rights among individuals. Not at least because it is one of the oldest concepts within the philosophy of human rights. “Omnia ergo quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite eis”(now this is the bit for the real humanists out there, if you cant do it, just
zipit) , can be seen as the oldest written definition of reciprocity. Yet this very example from the bible surpasses self-interest, it becomes a moral norm and can actually achieve legitimacy.
The concept of legitimacy, if achieved, is the most effective mode of social control. Here the actor does comply because he actually regards it as his obligation. “The operative process in legitimation is the internalization by the actor of an external standard”
1. The rule is therefore no longer regarded as a rule, but as the most plausible or, in its extreme totalitarian version, only way of conduct. To breach it, means to go against the individuals own instinct. Legitimacy goes beyond rationality. Absolute legitimacy means that the actors no longer consciously realise the option of choice, but subconsciously and automatically comply with the rule. An easy example for this could be that in an English supermarket nobody tries to haggle. The rule has implemented itself so firmly in the unconsciousness, that nobody even considers another possibility. Yet the fact that legitimacy does not only include the rational, but also the irrational side of a humans, means that this cannot be achieved by legal means. A justice of rights is always rational, to reach legitimacy means more. “Rights are lines in the sand, legal boundaries that must not be crossed, with punishment for transgressors”
2. Humbach
2 suggests trying to establish “right relationships” instead. Even if hard to define, this would be the sort of ultimate social control that legitimacy really means. But absolute legitimacy, and especially the means used to install it, also have to be regarded with care, as it lies very close to totalitarianism.
The idea of social determinism that underlies this idea, is despite frequent assaults by Liberalism perfectly conceivable. The example of the supermarket is only one, admittedly very trivial, example. In the middle ages in Europe nobody would have considered the possibility that god does not exist. Humans can be programmed, even if they are educated. Today’s supermarkets, to get a bit more sinister, are arranged to influence consumers behaviour even without relying on training (along the Pavlov’s dog lines) and without any coercion whatsoever. It is more a question of the means – by conviction or manipulation – and for what end. Human rights in my personal view would be a worthy end. Yet the main problem with this sort of social control, are the controllers. Who decides? If this can be done, on such an essential issue as human rights, by individuals at all, and is not a result of a collective subconscious decision of society. And this is a very big ‘if’.
Yet to achieve this kind of legitimacy with human rights on a global scale would mean to reduce their abuses quite significantly. Yet this cannot be done legally. The only way to achieve this – even though this is a hardly possible task in the best case, utopian and possibly dangerous in the worst case – is to win ‘harts and minds’. Using the persuasive power of the philosophical foundations of human rights, which to some degree exist in every culture, seems to be the only ultimately successful means to achieve legitimacy, and as the other concepts have little chance of implementing human rights, this clearly must be the way forwards.
Although this might ultimately be challenged by the foundation of the International Criminal Court. Yet until the individual nation-states are prepared to give up their sovereignty over legislation, this will in the best case lead to the occasional show trial of huge scale human right abusers, most likely after interventions. To fully engage in the jurisdiction of human right abuses the ICC will and can never have the necessary resources. So ultimately the ball goes back to the states, and national legislation and jurisdiction.
1: Hurd, I. 1999. Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International
Organisation 53 (1): 379-408.
2: Humbach, J. A. 2001. Towards a Natural Justice of Right Relationships. In Human Rights in
Philosophy and Practice, edited by B. M. Leiser and T. D. Campbell, 41-61. Aldershot,
Ashgate.